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oriented towards attainment of mutual understanding and consensus of heterogeneous
actors who are in a problem situation and aimed to settle it. The actors not only cognize
the world, but they create it. When occurs that they are bound by a common problem
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ently, although they recognize simultaneously the necessity of any coordinated actions
to control the situation. Following the conventional concept of truth by Poincaré, who
interpreted the truth as the result of a convention, an agreement may be achieved to
recognize certain subjective knowledge to be true for a restricted circle of actors. Such
knowledge may be called intersubjective. In contrast to the bureaucratic theory that
ignores individual qualities of the human being and sees it as a “cog” in the administra-
tive mechanism, the theory of intersubjective management proceeds from the fact that
the reserves of management efficiency rise should be sought not in the bureaucratic
machine modernization, but in the human being, in every person, in the use of his
intellectual and volitional resources.
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1 Introduction
The 20th century may be named the century of bureaucracy, since whole states, large
projects (atomic project, space project etc), industrial enterprises, institutions (schools,
universities etc), even small companies, as a rule, have been managed (and are still
being managed) at the basis of “Ideal Bureaucracy” principles, formulated by Weber
at the beginning of the past century (the term of management corresponds herein to
the classical meaning thereof) (Johnson et al. 1967). Nevertheless, the shortcomings
of this form of management process organization become apparent in the second half
of the century. So, for example, the work (Shepard 1965) noted that “the bureaucratic
structures are designed for the only purpose to exercise the actions which are amenable
to be programmed in any stable and predicted surrounding conditions. However, the
surrounding conditions become more and more volatile and rapidly changing. Now,
the necessity has occurred to create the organizations of such a type which would allow
adapting themselves quickly to any changing conditions; it is necessary to look for such
structures, with the help of which people can be organized for a non-programmable
innovatory activity”.
Reforms of bureaucratic mechanisms has started but they don’t give any marked
changes for the better in the sense of management systems perfection, in so far as they
haven’t practically touched the two basic principles of the bureaucracy: rigid hierar-
chy of the power and ignoring of individual qualities of the organization’s employees;
they reduce a human being into a “cog” in the bureaucratic machine. “Mechanistic
nature” and “impersonality” are perhaps the most characteristic features of the major-
ity of existing management systems, which, by this cause, don’t satisfy the more and
more increasing practical needs in the contemporary open and dynamic world. “We
need a more humanistic theory of organization”,—rightly believed (Shepard 1965).
But what are the principles such a theory is to be constructed on? To answer this
question, the present monograph proposes to develop the theory of intersubjective
management, which is opposed to the bureaucratic theory and proceeds from the idea
that the reserves of management efficiency rise should be sought not in the bureau-
cratic machine modernization, but in the human being, in every person, in the use of
his intellectual and volitional resources. However, to achieve this task, it has appeared
necessary to make one important methodical step—to perform transition from the clas-
sical scientific rationality to the postnonclassical one (Vittikh 2012b), which doesn’t
separate the subject from the object (just as the classic science does it), but, on the
contrary, takes into consideration the correlation of the knowledge derived from the
object, with the individual features of the subject and the means thereof for activities
(Stepin et al. 1996).
The fact is that even on physics lessons in the secondary school, the fundamen-
tals of classical science, intended to acquire objective and true knowledge, usually
being expressed in the laws of nature, were laid in our minds. We were told that this
objectivity was achieved by separation of the subject (the researcher) jointly with the
means of observation, from the object under research. The particularities of the sci-
entist’s personality and of the tools he is using “are carried out of the brackets”, and
it allows to assert that the law that has been found by this manner is valid always and
everywhere (certainly, within the limits of some restrictions). And when, at the school,
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we used to solve problems in physics, or when, in the university, we were occupied
with calculations of sustainability of the automatic control systems with application
of the laws of mechanics, the conviction was gradually taking root in our minds that it
was a classic scientific approach (with no exceptions!) which allowed the possibility
to comprehend reality, therefore, such an approach should be used to solve arising
practical problems.
However, when we came into collision with the real life problems, then, very often,
we were disappointed. It turned out that natural science with its impressive and recog-
nized scientific results when investigating the Nature, became powerless when we
tried to solve the multitude of, and I even think, the majority of social, economical and
humanitarian problems the mankind is deeply concerned about, because, instead of a
clear material object (for example, technical facilities under automated control, without
man participation) it was necessary to consider the community of people, existing in a
one or another problem situation and seeking to find a way out, i.e. to control this situa-
tion. In fact, a human existence is always an existence in some situations (Zotov 2010).
Would it be rightfully, when following the classical rationality, “to carry” the peo-
ple out of situation and to transform them into a certain “unified” subject who studies
the object—situation—“from aside”? No, it wouldn’t, of course, since the decisions,
made and realized by the people being “inside” (and not “outside”) of the situation,
shall determine the development of such situation.“And when everything in natural
phenomena looks like “inevitable”, which is caused by indisputable character of the
natural laws, then “the freedom of choice” is always written on the artificial phenom-
ena” (Simon 1972). But this is the human being who makes the choice: Herbert Simon
has used the term “artificial” in the sense of “made by human being”, to counterbalance
“the natural”.
In spite of the presence of such principal differences, quite often, when investi-
gating any artificial systems, being created and in function with participation of the
man (social, economical, socio-technical ones etc), the methods and means of natural
sciences are applied. This is justified as long as particular models, fragmentary and
reduced from “the whole”, created on the basis of disciplinarily organized natural sci-
ences; allow getting acceptable results for the practice. However, the man, the human
being is not taken into account, although, quite often, there are talks about the need
to consider the “human factor”—a kind of a “correction factor” to the results of the
“quasi-natural” processes modeling, taking place (with no man participation) in the
object under investigation.
In this aspect, the behaviorists go a little bit further: the man is in the field of their
vision, but is considered as a behavior system, which can be understood and described
in the terms of stimulus and reaction. Such an approach is used, for example, at devel-
oping of pilots’ behavior models by operating aircrafts, when there is, practically, no
time for reflection. Nevertheless, in all cases when the principles of classical scientific
rationality are applied, the human consciousness is not taken into consideration, and
that is, as a matter of fact, a basic precondition of laying any bureaucratic organization
which prescribes to the man who is reduced to the level of an automatic machine,
to fulfill any rigid instructions, to follow any established procedures of actions in
decision-making processes (we will consider the term “ decision-making processes”,
following Johnson et al. (1967), as a synonym of “management processes”).
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The above-mentioned bureaucratic principles are the basis to construct Manage-
ment, the decline of which was prognosticated by Cloke and Goldsmith (2004), since,
in their opinion, the time of bureaucrats and functionaries has passed. They draw
attention to the fact that the word manager is of the same root in English as the word
manacle (handcuffs, chains, shackles) which evokes associations with the era of slav-
ery and the slave trade, when managers acted as slave-drivers. In the era of serfdom,
they became feudal managers controlling the serfs, making them, with the force of
coercion, to work on the land of the proprietor, keeping the serfs obedient, collecting
rents and taxes. With the coming of the industrial society, managers used to apply
various forms of administrative compulsion and control, acting no longer alone, but
within the framework of complex management structures that they started to build.
A whole class of managers was formed, i.e. the people, called up to manage the
activity of other people, to impose their will on this people. The management, being
supported by the bureaucracy, begun to transform “the function to manage the social
systems into a direct or hidden power of individuals or of social groups as self-sufficient
and reserved on themselves social forces (subjects) in public interactions” (The World
Encyclopedia 2001). Managers in organizations become to be a privileged caste of
employees, separated from their “ordinary” members and having as a main goal of
their activity to keep their status (as minimum) and to grow in career. That is why the
decisions are often made for the sake of personal benefits, but not for the organization’s
benefits, and the national objectives are transformed into any formal clerical targets.
As a rule, the managers form a hierarchy, resulting in the appearance of a problem
of responsibility distribution among them, which bears a “unilateral” character, since
the top managers who possess more power may always dump the blame on the subor-
dinated managers of lower levels. As a result, the true causes of erroneous decisions
having brought to any undesirable and, often, to any sad consequences, remain hidden
and can manifest themselves some day in the future.
These problems of management as well as many others, examined in Cloke and
Goldsmith (2004), “reinforced” by a trite opinion that a person having been qualified
as manager is capable to manage in any field of activity, generate (instead of the order
conceived by the “ideal bureaucracy) an organizational chaos: endless coordination
and talks, protracted retardations in decision-making, increasing flow of documents
and lack of time to process them etc. Little by little, a belief that it all should be settled
fades away. Furthermore, if to examine the problem by a larger manner, at the global
level, it is to state that “at the end of the 20th century, the science lost its optimistic
belief in potentiality of the social management to put in good order the world of human
relationship, laid at the Age of the Enlightenment. Two World Wars which claimed mil-
lions of lives, bloody dictatorships of all kinds—from Nazism to Bolshevism, nuclear
tests, accidents at nuclear power stations—this is the list of managerial catastrophes
in the 20th century, which is far to be complete” (New Philosophical Encyclopedia
2010).
All that says that the management, in spite of constantly carried out programs of
training and re-training of managerial staff at all the levels, is in the situation of a deep
crisis. A forcible principle of the management organization is laid on the basis of this
crisis, when one person (the subject) uses the other person as the means to reach his
goals. Such a notion about management was being formed over the centuries and is
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firmly rooted in the minds of both managers–theoreticians and managers–practitioners,
who are convinced that for achieving the goals in view (never mind if we want it or
not), they have to force, in any case, the man to do what he doesn’t wish to do. But
such a “slave” labor is not only contrary to the ideas of humanism that the human
community put forward, it is simply ineffective. Therefore, there is an active search
in the contemporary science for any new, alternative approaches to the management,
designed to bring the society out of the crisis (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010).
The proposed theory of intersubjective management uses as a key notion the idea
of the actor, who, in contrast to the manager, is the participant of non-violent methods
of management, based not on coercion, but on mutual understanding and consensus
with the other actors.
2 Basic Concepts and Structure of the Theory of Intersubjective Management
2.1 Actor
The Cartesian Ontology, as the doctrine on the Being, depicts a rational and mecha-
nistic image of the world, subordinated to rigid laws where there is no space for the
man and for the consciousness, i.e. the being is characterized by irrespectivity to the
human activity, to their knowledge and thinking (Philosophy 2003). Correspondingly,
the classical science and, particularly, the natural science, proceeds from the fact that
the world can be described, without telling anything about the man which part is to be a
detached observer, able to describe objectively (preferably on mathematical language)
the events passing around him, without exerting any effect on their course (Dictionary
of Philosophical Terms 2004). And this objective knowledge is deemed to be a true
one. Such is the logic of classical scientific cognition.
Scientism, rendering absolute the social role of the science, created an ideological
foundation for the use of classical scientific rationality at investigations of social,
economical, socio-technical and other artificial systems, which resulted in the need to
be distanced, to dissociate the man from them. There were some scientists who worked
(and still go on working) in this direction. But such artificial systems cannot be created
and function in essence without participation of the people who, by their decisions
and actions, direct the development. Therefore, the man cannot be excluded from
the theory of management, and this, as a matter of fact, leads us to the change of the
scientific paradigm—transition from classical to postnonclassical scientific rationality
(Stepin et al. 1996; Vittikh 2012b). At the same time, a change of concepts on ontology
is taking place.
If the Cartesian ontological constructions consider the objective material world
outside and without the man, the fundamental ontology of M. Heidegger understands
the Being, first of all, as the Being of Man, i.e. the doctrine on the Being appears as the
Ontology of Subjectivity (Zotov 2010): the Man is placed in the centre of the subject
world which he constructs in his mind. By following Heidegger (2003), we move from
the “objective” world to the “subjective” world, and an individual, a human person
occupies the place of the unified subject of the classical scientific rationality.
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Based on the above-stated, we see appearing a concept which is fundamental for
the theory that we are working out—the concept of actor, i.e. the man, who, in contrast
to the subject of gnosiology, not only cognizes the world, but creates it. Each actor
has his own point of view on the world and on the processes therein, and, in this sense,
the actors are heterogeneous. When occurs that they are bound by a common problem
situation, the actors realize it differently, although they recognize simultaneously the
necessity of any coordinated actions to control the situation and they are liable for
the consequences of the decisions they make. Therefore, they make any communica-
tive actions, i.e the actions that are consciously oriented to its semantic perception.
Communicative action, pursuant to Habermas, is such an interaction of individuals,
which is regulated accordingly to any binding norms and oriented towards attainment
of mutual understanding by acting individuals, of their consensus (New Philosophical
Encyclopedia 2010; Social Philosophy: Dictionary 2006). So, the basic function of the
communication is the attainment of social community, individuality of every element
therein being retained. Habermas, in his theory of communicative action, considers
communication as the basic social process (The World Encyclopedia 2001), i.e. social
reality is constructed by means of images and notions, expressed in communication. In
other words, the actors are supposed to be communicatively rational. The communica-
tive rationality, which is, in the philosophy of Habermas, the rationality of solidarity
and collaboration, is opposed to any forcible rationality of management, directed to
the use in its interests of other people. With that all, the communicative rationality is
based on the intersubjective nature of the human mind.
Intersubjectivity is a structure of individual consciousness responding to the fact of
existence of other individuals. So far as “I” can only partially compose the world, it
receives from “the others” what it misses in its own experience (Modern Philosophical
Dictionary 1998). The world that we discover in the consciousness is an intersubjective
world (Philosophy 2004). Intersubjectivity represents a specific community among the
cognizing subjects, any conditions of interactivity and of transfer of knowledge owned
by one for another (The World Encyclopedia 2001). Subjective knowledge, significant
and “sure” (relatively true) for one actor, may be also valuable for the other actors,
being together with him in the same common problem situation, which compels them to
interact and to participate in a joint decision-making. Then, following the conventional
concept of truth by H. Poincaré, who interpreted the truth as the result of a convention,
we may achieve an agreement to recognize certain subjective knowledge to be true
for a restricted circle of actors in communication. Such knowledge may be called
intersubjective (Vittikh 2011).
The above said relates also to value orientations which key to understand should
be sought not in any subject—object relations of the people, but in intersubjective
relations of the same (The World Encyclopedia 2001). The actor, each of them having
his own world outlook, must compromise when choosing the system of values, since,
otherwise, it would be impossible to attain mutual understanding and consensus during
the decision-making. Often, this problem is artificially simplified, when, without any
discussion, the position of one of the actors is accepted, who has expressed it by any
target program he had prepared and which reflects only his point of view. A thesis
is postulated: “We shouldn’t waste time in talking, we have to do business”. So, the
program is adopted and comes under realization, but soon, it becomes clear that the
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results thereof don’t lead to any settlement of the problem situation; moreover, there
are new problems appearing which demand much bigger expenses in comparison to
those which would have been made at in-good-time-considered positions of the other
actors.
It appears to be important, herewith, that the actors use discourse—a form of com-
munication during which the statements of the “other” are thoroughly checked, under-
stood, refined, criticized and finally accepted or rejected. In the discourse, the main
role is played by argument, and coercion to consent is forbidden (Habermas 2006;
Solovieva 2009). Habermas considers the discourse to be an original criterion to deter-
mine if the achieved consent is true or false (Modern Philosophical Dictionary 1998).
Thus, in contrast to the manager for whom the principal tool to manage is a “vertical”
coercion and impact, the actor uses a “horizontal” interaction to achieve consent,
consensus, being supported by the solidarity of the actors. Solidarity (in the philosophy
of Rorty) is the turn of mind (opposed to the traditional objectivity) to unite various
points of view not on the platform of identity, but in the context of their differences.
These differences, according to Rorty, provoke no world outlook conflicts, but create
conditions for a free choice. No one among the positions united on the foundation
of solidarity pretends to the status to be sole, and that distinguishes principally this
approach from the classical rationality, based on the idea of possibility and accessibility
of one sole right decision (Vittikh 2009a). Rorty denies the need in a semantic centre,
supposing that the social hope is called to be supported not by “objectivity” but by
“solidarity” (The World Encyclopedia 2001). Besides, the solidarity is deemed as a
unity, an attraction of diversities, and not as uniformity, because the world gets renewed
through the contacts of diversities; “in their unity, the diverse “ones” complement each
other and grow up to the parts of the whole” (Modern Philosophical Dictionary 1998)
In this case, the system (the whole) “is grown from the bottom to the top” on the basis
of lowerarchy (Ackoff 2009), when the “lower” elements are the source of resources
and power for the “higher”, in the contrast to a hierarchical organization “from top to
down”, based on dictates of the supreme power.
The adherents of the management will not fail to note a potentially low discipline of
the actors, since, in the basis of such discipline, there are “soft” and “liberal” intersub-
jectivity and solidarity, assuming availability of a high level of “consciousness” of the
actors, which is extremely difficult to reach in the real life. “Discipline should be based
on coercion and violation”—they would say. Indeed, it is not entirely true, and more
specifically, not at all. The fact is that the discipline is a term fixing the obligatoriness
of subordination by “everybody” (human community, social groups, individuals) to
any established order (norms, rules etc), ensuring good organization, firm structure,
co-ordination and expectancy of interactions inside of a social integrity (in its statics
as well as in its dynamics and procedures), and this is ensured by any “external” (coer-
cion) and “internal” (interiorization of norms etc) mechanisms to maintain discipline
in the society (The World Encyclopedia 2001). It follows from this definition, that not
only coercion, but also personal convictions, fully formed as a result of adoption of
social, cultural and moral norms and values, may discipline the behavior of the man.
That is why, the theory of intersubjective management supposes that the actors are
“inwardly” motivated to communication and coordinated actions, but the only way
to reach it shall be a duly organized education. And what’s more, it is to be during the
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process of socialization of the individual in his young years, while the system of the
individual’s own views on the world is under formation. As a matter of fact, the ques-
tion is to educate the actor’ will—phenomenon of the self-regulation by the subject
of both his behavior and activity, providing the consciousness orientation and efforts
concentration towards the achievement thereof (The World Encyclopedia 2001).
Today, the basics of management training is conducted in the spirit of classical
management with its ideology of violence and coercion, but our entry into the infor-
mation society will be accompanied by dissemination of communicative rationality
and, correspondingly, by non-violent intersubjective relations among the people in the
processes of management (decision-making).
2.2 Situation
The human being is the being in situations (Zotov 2010). “The whole man’s initiative
is not only situationally determined, but situationally framed … The man has to act in
a situation, but the situation doesn’t specify to him how to act exactly, and therein lies
his freedom… The situation is coercion to the decision; the freedom is in the decision
it-self” (Hartmann 1997).
At first sight, the situation is presented as an objective reality not depending on the
man’s subjective point of view, but if to take in consideration the human consciousness,
it would be an error “to object” the situation, to consider it as something that exists by
it-self. “The situation is an ambiguous phenomenon; one cannot recognize therein the
degree of freedom’s part and the degree of rigid position of things” (Zotov 2010). For
example, an abundant snowfall is an objective natural phenomenon. But we realize it
differently: this snowfall gets on the car driver’s nerves: it might provoke traffic jams;
the employees of housing and communal services are worry about snow removal equip-
ment’s capacity to cope with it; children anticipate pleasure to play in snowballs, etc.
It is important that the man can understand the situation only “from the inside”, but
not from the positions of an external observer. That is why it cannot be interpreted as
either “objective” or “subjective” (Zotov 2010). In our example, a snowfall provokes
no emotions at a car driver, if he is not going to drive out; at an employee of housing
and communal services, if he is on leave; at a child, if he is ill and the parents don’t
allow him to go outdoors. In the above specified conditions (no need of car, a leave,
an illness), all the mentioned individuals become external observers.
Moreover, the man finds him-self to be not alone in the situation; Jean-Paul Sartre
wrote about it: “I exist in the midst of other existents and I can accept neither this others
existents only in the quality of objects, nor myself as existing only encircled by the
others. The situation is my position in the world, defined by relationships of utilization
and resistance of those realities that surround me… The structure of situation takes
shape from “my place”, “my body”, “my past”, “my position in relation to others” and
“my fundamental relation to the other” (Zotov 2010).
Thereby, every autonomous heterogeneous actor will “be preoccupied” in his own
way (according to M. Heidegger) about the situation, when this actor is placed in the
centre of the “subjective world” which includes all that his preoccupation concerns.
The description of the subjective world is the subjective (personal) ontology, com-
prehended as “the description and organization of what there is, of the multitude of
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existing things, and which determines how these things are interconnected” (Merrill
2003).
However, the situation may be comprehended by the actors as the matter of their
common care connected with the need of a joint decision-making for the purpose
to settle it. Then, elaboration of an ontological model of situation is required, i.e. a
coordinated description of the situation in the form of concepts and relations through
a multilateral dialog of heterogeneous actors (Vittikh 2009b).
It is to note that the necessity to make decision is comprehended by the actors not
in each situation. It is required for this purpose that they get unsatisfied by the state of
matters or, speaking generally, it is necessary that the degree of situation indeterminacy
should exceed a certain admissible threshold. In this context, we may speak about a
problem situation, when an unsatisfied state of matters is already comprehended, but
it is not yet clear what should be done to change it (Novikov and Novikov 2007).
There is multitude of sources of situation indeterminacy: natural, technological,
etc, but the main source is heterogeneity of actors, differences of their world outlook
positions. That is why, communicative actions, aimed to mutual persuasions, search
of compromises and convergence of points of view, play a key role in the processes
of attainment of actors’ mutual understanding and consensus, which, finally, provide
situation indeterminacy decreasing down to any acceptable level.
In concluding this section, it is appropriate to make a comment referred to the sep-
aration of the notion of “strategic management” and “situational (non-strategic) man-
agement” which seems to be rather arbitrary. In the Vikhansky and Naumov (1999),
strategic management supposes “a look from the future towards the present”, and non-
strategic management supposes elaboration and implementation of a plan of transition
from the present (and, correspondingly, from the past) to the future, provided that the
“environment will not be changed actually”. However, the man, in his “present”, pos-
sesses not only “the past”, but, similarly, the man realizes in the “present” (in the
current situation) his own “future” (Zotov 2010). The fundamental ontology of M.
Heidegger attaches a primordial importance to the notion of “now” which includes
both the past and the future. “The presence, he writes in his Heidegger (2003), is its
past by the manner of its being, which … every time comes true from its future”. Such
ability of the man to apply the desirable future for decision-making in the present is
evidence of his power to manage “strategically”. And, at the same time, he can carry
out a “non-strategic” management of “linear” development from the past through the
present towards the future. In other words, there is no need to distinguish strategic and
situational (current, operative) management, as far as, figuratively speaking, these are
two sides of the same coin.
2.3 Communication
As soon as the heterogeneous actors begin to comprehend (individually at first) the
problem situation, they proceed to the communicative actions in order to understand
the situation in concord, i.e. to attain mutual understanding, then to find, by con-
certed efforts, a solution which would be convenient for everyone, to settle it. Thus,
the communication is not identified herein with narrower notions of connection and
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information transfer, but it shall serve as the means of provision for the actors’ mutual
understanding.
Usually, the classical management which is built on the principles of bureaucracy
doesn’t set such a task. The manager communicates with his subordinates, basically,
for the purpose to get from them information which he needs to make a decision, but he
has no necessity to achieve any mutual understanding. A similar picture may be seen
in any collective management when each member of the collective, being responsible
for a determined “his own” sphere of activity, is far to seek to delve deeply into the
substance of the concerns of his colleagues. If anybody among them has prepared a
draft decision, it will be coordinated more often formally, if only it wouldn’t contradict
any interests of others. With that all, the main argument they adduce is the “lack of time”
for an intersubjective activity, any extraordinary circumstances being put forward.
We can agree that in any emergency situations there is no time for reflection,
discussion and negotiation, as a rule. But it doesn’t mean that even in “ordinary”
problem situations one must obey the will of some single authoritarian manager.
“Firefighters” decision-making methods should be used only in appropriate situations.
In any other events, the actors must understand each other and act in concord. The
question is how to attain this mutual understanding.
It is to note first of all, that the question is about the negotiations of the actors,
intended to render their positions closer, in results of which they achieve a general
consent on the disputed issue, i.e. consensus (no formal voting is supposed to be
conducted). Habermas believes consensus is exactly the main goal of communica-
tions, aimed at understanding, and from the standpoint of consensus’ reachability, he
emphasizes a particular form of communication: a discourse, when consent is reached
in result of arguments and not of coercion. Habermas gives the name of “ideal speech
situation” (Modern Philosophical Dictionary 1998) to the conditions that can allow
such a rational consent.
Habermas develops the concept of discourse as a special form of speech commu-
nication based on reflexive dialogue, accentuating all the aspects, significant for the
participants, both of the subjects under discussion and of the dialogue’s situation (The
World Encyclopedia 2001). He proposes, in his discourse ethics, to take into consider-
ation not only the significance of any firm moral norms, but also the degree of possible
solidarity of discourse participants (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010). So, the
discourse is understood as an ideal form of communication implemented out of touch
with traditions, authority etc, and aimed at critical discussion and substantiation of
opinions and actions of the communication participants (Modern Philosophical Dic-
tionary 1998). The discourse thinking, displaying in succession of notions and judg-
ments, is set in opposition with an intuitive, comprehending the whole, independently
and without any successive display (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010).
With the assistance of discourse, a free and void of any restrictions communication
of actors, having for an object to reach their mutual understanding, becomes rational.
It is to add that the society is deemed by Habermas not as a social construction, but
as a communicative mechanism which determines not only dynamics, but also the
essence of social processes (Loskutnikova 2011). Habermas takes as a principle of a
social life’s theoretical interpretation not any material productive forces, providing an
onward transformation of the Nature by human being, but a “productive force of com-
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munication”, weaving the social substance and providing its onward rationalization. It
is exactly the communicative way of actions, where the co-ordination of participants’
plans of actions is implemented through a mechanism of mutual understanding in the
environment of the natural language, that provides reproduction of the society as a
“life world” (Furs 2001). In other words, a communicative view on the world will take
on a more and more increasing significance.
2.4 Self-Organization
Autonomous heterogeneous actors operate, not waiting for orders from any central
managing body, they organize themselves in communicating with each other and elab-
orating concerted decisions how to control the situation with taking into account
the common interests and not forgetting their proper ones. The self-organization is
understood as a spontaneous unplanned emergence of order (of certain global struc-
tures) derived from fortuitous (chaotic) local interactions without any outer organiz-
ing impacts (Kueppers 1999). The social systems, in this sense, are not exclusions,
since manifestations of self-organization are discovered as far back as in the primary
social form of the primitive system i.e. a community where the general meeting of
the community’s members served as a social institute ensuring the execution, without
mediators, of the self-organization functions based on the principle of “each for all
and all for each” (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010).
The relationships of self-organization in the community of that time had the charac-
ter of a “primitive democracy”, and the governing structures were directly “interlaced”
into the great bulk of the community’s members (Modern Philosophical Dictionary
1998). Emerging problem situations, affecting the interests of the community’s mem-
bers and possessing an indeterminacy, were being regulated, by way of local inter-
actions, at the summit gatherings of the community, where, in the persons of the
community’s members themselves, a merger of “legislative” and “executive” power
were taking place (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010). In other words, ability for
a social self-organization was the community’s foundation, providing an opportunity
to carry out managing processes (decision-making processes) (Johnson et al. 1967).
Being in a “natural condition”, wherein any moral and legal restrictions were prac-
tically absent, an individual possessed, nevertheless, all the rights of self-protection,
and he used to act following the “natural law” that reflected an elementary idea of
justice. Having passed to the “public status”, the people transferred the function of the
“natural law” interpretation to the legislative power’s bodies, and the function of self-
protection—to the executive power’s bodies (Dictionary of Philosophical Terms 2004).
Appearance of a mediator in the person of State as machinery to govern the society,
provided with the power and supported by the force of law or by the bodies of coer-
cion, changed the communal model of self-organization. Now, the self-organization
was being carried out at the level of local interactions of the people only when the
indeterminacy of situation could be regulated by means of direct negotiations without
referring to involve such global structures as State authorities and normative legal acts
elaborated thereby. Whenever an indeterminacy of any situation in the human com-
munity (e.g. social tensions) exceeded a certain critical value, then an intervention of
the State with its powers was needed to regulate social relations. Changes of these
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relations, in its turn, gave “urges” to the authorities from the society for elaboration
of any new forms of behavior and interactions of people at a local level. So, such a
circular causal dependence, coupled with the indeterminacy of situations, forms the
basis of social self-organization in the contemporary (“non-communal”) sense of the
word (Kueppers 1999; Vittikh 2002).
However, the tendency to extend the sphere of regulation by State of the people’s
life and activity (even in those events when there were no needs at all to do so)
developed the system of compulsory cooperation, putting down, little by little, the
public self-organization. H. Spencer named “militant” this type of society. People
who form a militant society, “must possess a blind faith in authority and readiness to
be guided by the others, and, therefore, comparatively small initiative. The habit to see
everywhere an official intervention develops the certitude that this official intervention
must be everywhere; and the mode of life, when everything is determined by a personal
discretion and there are no examples of impersonal course of events, renders them
unable to understand any social processes as a result of self-regulatory orders” (Spencer
1997). In such a society, the centralized governance, drawing the decision-making up to
the top authorities, pushes the social self-organization to the background, reducing the
people into a “cog” in the State-owned bureaucratic machine, into ordinary executors
of the will of other people.
At the same time (as we have mentioned in the Introduction), the reserves of qual-
ity of life rise, of economy efficiency and of State governing should be sought in the
people themselves, in each human being, in the use of his personal intellectual and
volitional resources. But a rigid administrative hierarchy and centralization, binding
the people’s initiative, are unacceptable, so far as, to resolve this problem, it is nec-
essary to maintain the development of self-organization as a fundamental property
of any complex social system. Pitirim Sorokin, classical sociologist, accentuated his
attention thereon. He wrote that “one of the most principal factors determining the
functioning and development of any system lies inside of it-self. In this sense, any
inside integrated system is an autonomous self-regulatory, self-governing or, if you
please, a “balanced” unity” (Sorokin 2006) . It is exactly the self-organization that
plays a key system-generating role at emergence of order from chaos (Prigozhin and
Stengers 1986), representing disordered primeval origins, primitive matter, from which
the world was formed (New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010). We may consider, at
this basis, the self-organization as the main way of genesis of the most different objects
(including social ones) and join us to the idea about primacy of the self-organization
phenomenon (Chaykovsky 1993).
2.5 Intersubjective System
In their aspiration to understand the sense of the problem situation and to settle it by
decreasing the situation’s indeterminacy down to an acceptable level, the autonomous
actors organize themselves into a system which we shall call an intersubjective sys-
tem (Vittikh et al. 2012a). Each actor, together with intellectual, material and work-
ing resources in his possession, forms a basic element of an intersubjective system,
i.e. a holon (derived from Greek’s “o´λoς”—all, whole, entire, with the suffix “on”
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indicating a part, a particle) (Koestler 1989). The notion of “holon” means a whole,
being a part of another whole, including in it-self any components under the actor’s
control intended for processing, transporting and storing physical objects (substance,
energy) and information. Being independent and autonomous, the holon, disposing of
developed communication means, is able to interact with other holons, forming new
(composite) holons. In other words, an intersubjective holonic system is constructed
on the “part—whole” principle, in contrast to the systems being organized on the basis
of “cause-effect” relationship among the elements (Vittikh 2010).
Holons can not only unite (integrate themselves) into composite holons, but, on
the contrary, break up (disintegrate). Processes of integration and disintegration of the
holons determine evolution of the intersubject system, which must be considered as a
developing system (Ackoff 2009), always remaining open and uncompleted. The fact
is that in processes of realization and regulation of the problem situation, the com-
position of participants (holons) may not only be changed, but also their agreements,
connected with their priorities, guiding lines and requesting solutions tasks, may be
corrected. Thus, this is communicative rationality that must predominate in the con-
sciousness of the actors who direct, by their decisions and actions, the development of
an intersubjective system, and not the rationality of target which supposes a rigid ori-
entation to a “set from on high” target and plans being subject to a rigorous execution.
To illustrate the above-said, let us apply to some examples.
The Volga Automobile Factory (VAZ, abbreviation of Volzhsky Avtomobilny
Zavod) in Togliatti was created to manufacture motor-cars under the prices which
would appropriate the purchasing capacity of the population, i.e. with the purpose to
meet public demand in this kind of industrial goods. In order to conduct economic and
technical feasibility as well as production planning studies, an Italian factory which
produced the FIAT motor-cars was taken as prototype. As a result, a national automo-
bile factory was designed being a rather close copy of the Italian original; it was clear,
prior to the construction of VAZ, what, how and with the use of what resources the pro-
duction would be organized. Nobody doubted that only a program and target-oriented
method of planning and management, requiring a strict execution of established reg-
ulations and procedures on each production site would ensure achievement of the
given task. The factory was built, the production of motor-cars was mastered, and the
products began to flow to consumers. So, if all the surrounding conditions had stayed
stable, or were changed by the manner that had been foreseen by the plans, then no
problems would have been arisen.
However, since those times the world has been becoming more and more open and
dynamic; consumers requirements have been changing, the demand for motor-cars, in
virtue of its stochastic nature, has been badly amenable to predictions; the market has
begun to receive the manufactured abroad motor-cars, which are in competition with
VAZ models, etc. The VAZ production lines needed in modernization, in technical re-
equipment, serious problems with personnel arose, etc. But the centralized bureaucratic
system, laid already in the basis of the enterprise management at the design stage,
turned to be unable to master with this always growing “snowball” of problems.
In the middle of the 90-th, a tentative was undertaken to reform the VAZ manage-
ment system towards its decentralization: VAZ structural subdivisions were becoming
autonomous “business unities”, acquiring a relative independence and freedom of
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choice in regard of kinds of activity with the purpose to achieve a higher profitabil-
ity level. In the issue, the economy of the enterprise would have to be much more
efficacious. Nevertheless, for the different reasons, this reform was not fated to come
true.
Let us examine, as an alternative example, the organization, and more precisely, the
self-organization of Silicon Valley in California (USA), which was “engendered” and
“cultivated” as an intersubjective (and non bureaucratic) system. It is known from the
history of Silicon Valley origins, that in 1937, two graduates of the Stanford University
(two actors)—Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard decided to unify the resources in their
possession and to found, in the garage in Palo Alto, an office of their company and a
small workshop (basic holon) to develop electronic devices. This action gave rise to
the development of one of the biggest world companies: the Hewlett-Packard (HP).
The Company’s founders didn’t aim to install a production line and to sell any specific
devices or equipment, because, first of all, they wanted to create a company of great
vitality, the profits of which would derive from the use of achievements of science and
new technologies. Therefore, the key role in the Company’s organization and develop-
ment was played by knowledge (and not by a status position) of the collaborators, by
their solidarity (and not by an administrative coercion) and by readiness to harmonize
their personal interests with the corporative ones.
The idea to found their proper company was given to Mr. Hewlett and Mr. Packard by
the professor of Stanford University Frederick Terman, who, being worried about the
mass departure of the University’s graduates (“brain drain”), began to support actively
the other Stanford students (potential actors) in their aspiration to found companies
not far from the University. As the result, without any “steering” administrative body
participation, a network of research and industrial firms started to get formed around
the Stanford University, which the journalist Don Hoefler called in 1971 the Silicon
Valley. By the way, Frederick Terman is widely credited with being “the father of
Silicon Valley”.
The firms (holons) situated on the territory of Silicon Valley, are interacting in a nat-
ural manner with each other, getting “integrated” and “disintegrated”, and, as a result
of this, a synergetic effect is being created, i.e. birth of new scientific and technological
knowledge which is further converted into profits and corporative development.
Thus, Silicon Valley may be considered as an intersubjective system, being devel-
oped on the basis of lowrarchy—“from bottom upwards”. Anyhow, it doesn’t mean
that there is no place for hierarchy in such a system. Autonomous actors, possess-
ing sufficient freedom, may agree among them to establish hierarchical relationships
when the interests of the common cause require it. Nevertheless, the principles of “ideal
democracy” formulated by Ackoff (2009) in his work should be followed herein:
• everyone among those who may be affected by a decision that is being made must
be able to participate directly or indirectly in this decision-making;
• everyone who possesses authority over the others must be subject to collective
authority of the others over him;
• an individual or a group may do whatever they like provided that it doesn’t affect the
interests of other subjects. If this may affect the others, the action must get approved
by these latter or by their proxies.
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In the same article, Ackoff gives a short description of a “purely” lowrarchical struc-
ture of a well known Visa Corporation, which may be considered as an intersubjective
system. “Un example of a radically decentralized organization, in which the initial
authority rises from below, is given by Visa where its users are its owners. Dee Hock,
the founder of Visa Corporation, called this company “an overturned holding”. By
contrast with a holding, i.e. one company possessing many other companies, Visa is
the company owned by its member banks and other institutes—issuers of Visa cards.
They are simultaneously its owners and its users. In many cases, they are also its sup-
pliers. Organizational structure of the Visa Corporation was deliberately designed as
a “federative” system, and it comprises series of regional, national and international
organizations, each of them having its own members and board of directors. Each
organizational level receives its authority not from upper but from lower levels. Deci-
sions are made by votes of boards at various levels, with a two or three months’ cycle
of a matter passing through all the levels. For example, the Visa Corporation members
voted on the matter of service costs for themselves to all the Visa transactions and to
some other payments for additional services. However, the members of the organiza-
tion are free to decide which Visa product to use, or to leave entirely the Visa system,
or to offer a competing product” (Ackoff 2009).
2.6 Structure of the Theory of Intersubjective Management
There are following distinctions between the notion of “theory”, adopted in classi-
cal natural science, and interpretation of this term which is used with reference to
intersubjective management:
1. If the natural scientific theory is aimed to detect and to uselatent forces of Nature,
then the theory of intersubjective management is aimed to intellectual and volitional
resources of people in the processes of decision-making.
2. Classical scientific rationality, focusing attention on the object, excludes, at the-
oretical description, everything that relates to the subject and to the means of its
activity; thus, the man with the means of observation finds him-self out of the object
and outside the theory. Postnonclassical scientific rationality, being a methodolog-
ical foundation for the theory of intersubjective management, proceeds from the
following: a subject, together with means of observation and of activity, performs
a cognitive-activity-function, being inside of the object (of the situation), and, cor-
respondingly, a man and means of activity are component parts of the theory.
3. Unlike classical scientific theory dealing with a universal idealized object, the
theory of intersubjective management is an ad hoc theory related to a unique
idealized object i.e. a situation which is realized and controlled (regulated) by the
inside being people i.e.actors.
4. It is admitted that natural scientific knowledge is objectively-true, whereas, in the
theory of intersubjective management, the knowledge of actors is subjective or
intersubjective. Nevertheless, the fact is not refuted that each actor has a certain
reserve of generally admitted objective scientific knowledge he acquired in school,
university or throughout his practical life activity.
123
82 V. A. Vittikh
5. Classical scientific theory is created “for all the time” and is applied (as required)
by the theory users for the purpose to solve the emerging before them problems,
but the ad hoc theory of intersubjective management is developed and applied
by the actors themselves at the pace of situation development, i.e. in real time.
Figuratively speaking, actors are “both authors and performers of their own drama
which is cognized by them, after all” (Kokhanovsky et al. 2004).
Thus, the structure of theory of intersubjective management comprises:
• heterogeneous actors, endowed with intersubjectuive consciousness and holding on
communicative rationality;
• intersubjective system—a holonic system with developed means of communication,
providing possibility to attain mutual understanding of actors in the processes of
decision-making to regulate the situation;
• personal knowledge of each actor, expressing his material world positioned “in the
field of view” of the actor prior to emergence of the problem situation (i.e. this is
the pre-understanding of the situation) (Vittikh 2005);
• intersubjective knowledge—shared and admitted by all actors, realizing themselves
to be in a specific situation, results of their agreement and consent on the basis of
what principles, rules and norms the decisions to control the situation will be made
(i.e. these are achieved agreements about “the rules of the game” in the processes
of decision-making).
These agreements are attained by the actors within the framework of the following
types of intersubjectivity (Huebner 1996).
Semantic intersubjectivity assumes explicitness and common consent with regard
to notions and judgments built of them, i.e. they are understood equally by everybody
and therefore may be applied in the same way.
Empirical intersubjectivity implies that statements that are based on empirical facts
are designated as rationally substantiated. In this case, it is necessary to have possibility
to clearly understand these facts, they must without fail be acceptable and recognized
by somebody, i.e. well-founded nature of judgments by facts and observation is recog-
nized to be necessary.
Logical intersubjectivity considers as being rationally substantiated such statements
which are a result of logical deduction. This also assumes intelligibility, explicitness
and overall acceptability.
Operational intersubjectivity proceeds from reproducibility of patterns for actions
and reasoning. It is assumed that a certain sequence of actions is always based on
this pattern in an explicit, generally and obligatory accepted manner. Single elements
of such a technology and their sequence that compose this pattern are understood by
everybody in a unique manner and, in principle, can be reproduced in the same form.
Normative intersubjectivity assumes general acceptability of norms and rules of
behavior and appraisal. If a certain activity is guided it-self by norms, it is also con-
sidered as being rationally substantiated. Although, a norm is at the same time a guide
to action and, in operational sense, doesn’t differ often from this latter, nonetheless,
the word “norm” is usually associated with specific value preferences.
In conclusion of this section, it should be noted that the above-expounded non-
conventional understanding of the term “theory” is in consonance with the ancient
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(platonic) notion of “theory”, which is contained in the monograph of Losev (1969).
In his opinion, “the Plato’s term of “theory” represents such state of consciousness
which has as its object an organized and shaped reality and which designs analytically-
synthetically this reality on the basis of direct vision and contemplation. In the other
words, we discover in this term a mutual merger of a directly given and of a consciously
designed objectivity, so typical for Plato and for the whole Antiquity”. Thus, the Plato’s
term of “theory” has nothing to do with the modern European meaning of the word”
(Losev 1969).
3 On Elaboration and Appliance of the Theory of Intersubjective Management
3.1 Process of Decision-Making with Appliance of the Theory of Intersubjective
Management
The theory of intersubjective management, as it was noted in the previous section, is
intended to achieve a mutual understanding of heterogeneous actors in the process of
decision-making on how to regulate a problem situation; this theory, being elaborated
by the actors themselves, plays the role of a peculiar “integration platform”, assisting
to converge their positions.
The traditional theory of decision-making (see, e.g. Zub 2010) poses no question
about any mutual understanding, and this is rather strange, since it is difficult to imagine
a more or less satisfactory decision which would be made under such conditions
when interested persons didn’t understand each other. More precisely, this question is
raised sometimes, but in an absolutely different formulation which assumes that the
person who makes the decision is a leader (manager), and all the others are detached
observers. Therefore, the text-book (Zub 2010) notes that “the decisions made by the
leader are under an intent look both of subordinates and of multiple observers… The
leader performs the role of a thinker who looks to the future. He must possess vision
of prospects of problem situation’s development and explain to the subordinates the
interdependence of events”.
Thus, we see here the manifestation of ideology of management oriented towards
“the cult of bosses”: leader is the thinker, strategist, master etc, whereas the people
around him need to be protected and watched over by the leader, but they-self may not
show any initiative. This idea gets, rather often, a curious continuation: if someone
is a leader, then it means that he is supposed to be a creative, well-educated, highly
professional man, even with an impeccable moral reputation. But, unfortunately, this
is not always the case.
The theory of intersubjective management has absolutely different and, in a certain
sense, opposed prerequisites. In place of managers, i.e. professional chiefs, we see
appearing of united actors, realizing the problem situation and, at the basis of partner-
ship relations, striving to regulate it, observing the attained agreements and resorting
to no forcible methods (including administrative coercion). In the quality of actors
may appear citizens, representatives of authorities, business and social organizations
who may have, as a rule, quite various and contradictory interests.
The representatives of business will strive to get profits even when they participate
in any social projects, an official will try to keep his “position in the authority”,
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providing (accordingly to his official functions) the population with governmental
services. Against such a multiple background of aspirations, a match of interests will
be most probably a rare exclusion. Thus, diversity becomes a source of conflicts in the
processes of decision-making by heterogeneous actors. The question is how to treat
the conflicts.
One position is to eradicate conflicts by all possible (political or spiritual) means.
“Overcoming of a social conflict, from this point of view, must lead to harmonization
of social relationships, to some ideal condition, happy harmony, to a life without
struggle. The implementation of ideal of a conflict-free state is transferred, as a rule,
to the long-term future and to the afterlife (“City of God”). The more realistic theories
of social relationships considers a conflict as a constant and irremovable component
of the public life which is, in either event, included into the structure of cooperation
(through competition in the common cause, contest and manifestation of initiative)”
(New Philosophical Encyclopedia 2010).
Thus, another point of view is to regulate conflicts, and not to eradicate them. It
is based on the theory of a free society which represents a gathering of a community
(and, accordingly, of authorities), united by laws which recognize the right of indi-
viduals to be united with those and in such a manner as they like. A model of a free
society provides an existence of a multitude of associations, but no one among them
is “privileged” and no one has any special moral importance… The theory of free
society is a description of conditions under which various modes of lifeco-exist, but
not a description of conditions under which they are drawn into a mutual conformity
(Kukathas 2011). The concept of free society and conflicts regulation is laid into basis
of construction of the theory of intersubjective management, which, in its turn, plays
a key role in the process of decision-making to regulate a problem situation (Fig. 1).
Let us examine the main stages of this process.
3.2 Formation of Intersubjective System
In proportion as they become aware of the problem situation, the heterogeneous actors
start to communicate with each other, forming an intersubjective system, within the
framework of which they will conduct negotiations about acceptable for everyone
way to go out of the arisen situation. Intersubjective system is an open system, having
a holonic structure, which, in the terms of the work (Kukathas 2011), represents
“community” as an association of “partial associations”. Here, we can trace back the
similarity of the positions of Koestler (1989), being the first to suggest to use the
notion of “holon” as a basic element of systems organized on the principle of “part—
whole”, and Kukathas, who, being based on a similar approach, gave the definition
of “community”, by answering an important question, what of common must have
people for being considered as a community (Kukathas 2011).
The fact is that a community is not only an aggregate of individuals, not only that to
which they just belong and of which they are members. The problem consists exactly
in the fact that we call communities the most various kinds of human associations.
For example, Kukathas examines in Kukathas (2011) the model of F. Tönnies, “who
distinguished a community from an association by the principle that the members of
community not only live close by, they have also a certain common origin. Associations
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Actualization of actors' personal knowledge
Intersubjective agreements of actors
Attainment of mutual understanding of actors
Decision-making
Fig. 1 Process of decision-making to regulate a problem situation
may be founded and constructed, but a true community is formed by a natural manner,
on the grounds of kinship and family relations, as well as on the grounds of habitats,
views and experience. In this sense, one can be a member of a community only if he
was born in. And, as far as everything is focused to the question of birth, status and
views, but not of an agreement and interests, living in one place is a necessary but not
a sufficient condition for existence of a community”.
The other community model of Maclver emphasizes importance of the unity of
interests. However, as Kukathas notes, availability of common interests doesn’t convert
a group of people into a community. For example, people at a bus stop are interested
in a timely arrival of the bus and a well-ordered getting inside, but they don’t become
a community because of that. And then, he gives his proper definition of community:
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“Community represents an aggregate of individuals with common understanding of
what, in the framework of this aggregate, refers to the public sphere and what refers
to the private one” (Kukathas 2011).
Based on this definition and assuming that the intersubjective system is a commu-
nity, we come to the fact that the actors must agree with each other and recognize the
achieved agreements with regard to common interests, but not forgetting about their
own interests, i.e. they must have a certain mutual understanding of difference between
a public (a group) sphere and a private (an individual) sphere.
A community appears where there is this mutual understanding; it also follows
from the above-said that “many varieties of associations, the members of which are
dispersed at a large expanse, are still communities” (Kukathas 2011). Awareness by
each actor of his membership in the community plays a primordial “starting” role in
the process of decision-making to regulate a problem situation.
The actors, together with resources they possess, form holons, and the common
“preoccupation” that they have recognized, performs a system-forming function when
the intersubjective system is self-organizing.
Important is also recognition and understanding of the fact that a man-actor can
simultaneously realize him-self in several problem situations and, correspondingly, in
several intersubjective systems. For example, resolving any problems in his office, the
man can simultaneously be concerned by the state of health of his close relative in
the family; therefore he has to share loyalty between these problems, his resources,
making a choice: be concentrated on performance of his office tasks or to visit a
chemist’s shop, to buy some medicine and to bring it for the sick person. Therefore
let us briefly examine the approach to solution of this problem of loyalty conflict,
proposed by Kukathas in his Theory of Diversity and Freedom (Kukathas 2011).
The author of this theory proceeds from the fact that each man belongs to a multitude
of communities and shares loyalty among them. These loyalties clash with each other
(in our example, the loyalty related to the office tasks clashes with the loyalty related
to the family).
Fundamental principle of a free society is the principle of freedom of associations,
and the first conclusion from it isthe principle of freedom to leave association. The sec-
ond conclusion is the principle of mutual tolerance of associations (Kukathas 2011).
In contrast to the Plato’s “State/Ship” metaphor, which declares social unity and social
hierarchy to be a key to understand the society, the work (Kukathas 2011) uses the
metaphor of archipelago of diverse communities, existing in the sea of “mutual toler-
ance. This liberal archipelago represents a community of communities, not generated
and not governed by any single authority, although it is a variety of a structure where
the authorities act in conformity with the laws, which, by themselves are out of any
control by a single authority”.
A free society is supposed to have availability of multitude of authorities, indepen-
dent of each other, respect of some authorities to independence of others, unwillingness
to meddle in their business, while the existence of authorities is supported by readiness
of citizens to submit to them. In this way, an authority is understood as the force to
which one appeals with the purpose to settle conflicts, when it has been impossible to
settle them by another means, e.g. agreements without mediators. Liberalism supposes
that no one authority possesses an absolute understanding of matters being the cause
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of conflicts, but this authority, nevertheless, is needed for the purpose to settle conflicts
(Kukathas 2011).
So, if we proceed from the principles of free society, the formation of an intersub-
jective system to regulate a problem situation must come to a creation (on the basis of
self-organization) of a community of communities (a composite holon), representing
an association of actors (together with resources in their possession),who possess com-
mon understanding of what kind of matters, within the framework of this association,
shall be regulated jointly, and what kind of matters shall be settled by each actor inde-
pendently. In order to legalize these accords, actors enter into agreements which share
zones of responsibility for adopted decisions. For settlements of eventual conflicts,
one or several actors are endowed of lowrarchy-based authority and resources (Ack-
off 2009), i.e. the “higher” elements of intersubjective system receive authority and
resources from the “lower” elements. But determining processes in the intersubjective
system are the processes of a non-violent communication of actors, based (according
to Habermas) on “solidarity, orienting common will” (New Philosophical Encyclope-
dia 2010). Strictly speaking, there is no upper or lower level in such a system; there
is no division for levels at all, “there are only interactive key points of responsibility”
(Cloke and Goldsmith 2004).
Bureaucratic systems are built on an opposite assumption, supposing that the people
are not willing or unable to take responsibility upon them for consequences of their
activity. Then, a strict control and hierarchical order are pushed on foreground, requir-
ing that each decision would be repeatedly rechecked by managers of various levels.
But such a “guardianship” generates exactly the situation, when “an important part of
personnel is not opposed to be ruled by authoritarian managers and are ready to act in
the role of unwise children in exchange for a reduced liability” (Cloke and Goldsmith
2004). Intersubjectibe systems, on the contrary, are aimed to increase shared liability
for common success of the community.
3.3 Actualization of Actors’ Personal Knowledge
Actors aspire to understand the problem situation, i.e. to catch its sense; with all
that, each of them has its pre-understanding (Modern Philosophical Dictionary 1998;
The World Encyclopedia 2001; Vittikh 2005). Both there is no cognition without
knowledge, and there is no understanding without preceded pre-understanding. Pre-
understanding, according to Heidegger, makes subjectively painted the understanding,
connected with interpretation of any text (Shulga 2004). Pre-understanding, expressing
objective world of the man, situated in its “field of vision”, as a matter of fact, represents
the aggregate ofa priori personal knowledge of the actor (Vittikh 2007), on the basis
of which he comprehends the sense of the formed situation. In other words, it is just
personal knowledge that is actualized (turned out to be mobilized) in the first instance,
i.e. the knowledge which the actor acquired before appearance of the problem situation.
We may divide this knowledge into verified knowledge and axiological knowledge
(Vittikh 2009c). Scientific researches which are conducted in natural sciences (physics,
chemistry, biology etc), have as its results some knowledge, the truth of which is not
only alleged, but proved, explained; at the same time, the knowledge’s content doesn’t
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depend on researchers, and that allows to refer it to the category of objective one. Let
us call it verified knowledge.
Side by side with it, an important part of knowledge, acquired, for example, in
technical sciences, is applicable only in any specific situations of life and bears a
subjective character, though it has a big practical value being intended to satisfy human
needs. Such knowledge may be defined as axiological knowledge, accentuating its
values in contrast to the truth of verified scientific knowledge. We may also speak
about consistency, feasibility, interpretation ability of axiological knowledge, etc.
In other words, classical scientific verified knowledge is not considered to be unique
form of knowledge which, in accordance with contemporary conceptions, is deter-
mined as information being of social importance and recognized by certain social
subjects and by society in whole to be exactly in the capacity of knowledge (The
World Encyclopedia 2001).
People began to apply axiological knowledge long before they started to acquire
verified knowledge. Primitive man was able to orient him-self on the ground, he knew
the habits of animals, distinguished the properties of plants, had an idea about human
anatomy, etc. All this knowledge was of a big practical value for him. And only
somewhere in the 6th century B.C., when the thinkers of Ancient Greece divided the
“subject” and the “object”, first notions of verified knowledge and its truth appeared.
Since that, axiological and verified components of the knowledge have been devel-
oping simultaneously and not independently but complementing one another. So, for
example, creation of fundamentals of mechanics by I. Newton in 17th century was
preceded by accumulation of large amount of axiological knowledge, with the aid of
which complex building structures were erected, ships and armaments were created
etc. On the other hand, mechanics laid grounds for the origin of axiological knowl-
edge, important for the people, practical appliance of which allows, up to now, satisfy
more and more increasing needs of the humankind.
It is clear that each individual is able to acquire on his own a restricted amount of
personal (both axiological and verified) knowledge. Therefore, colliding with inde-
terminacy of any formed situation, the man tries to use personal knowledge of other
people, each of them having his own pre-understanding of situation. For example,
solution of any problem of industrial manufacture may require the knowledge of a
process engineer, a power engineer, a financier, an ecologist and many other special-
ists, examining the problem situation from the positions of their personal professional
knowledge. The question is in what extent this knowledge is accessible for surrounding
people and how efficiently it is used.
If a personal knowledge is “attached” to its possessor, then its use becomes depen-
dent on “caprices” of an individual right up to refusal to apply it in the processes
of decision-making. At the same time, it is very important, in the stage of pre-
understanding, to enable each actor to get acquainted with the points of view of his
colleagues, and that can be resulted, among any others consequences, in transforma-
tion of his proper views on the problem situation. Then, it is necessary “to extract from
the subject” this knowledge, to formalize it and to present in a convenient form to the
interested actors. These problems are successfully solved by means of ontologie0073
(Smirnov 2012). In other words, actualization of personal knowledge of actors can
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be implemented by elaboration and placement of their personal ontology in computer
networks.
3.4 Intersubjective Agreements of Actors
In order to master the situation with concerted efforts, heterogeneous actors must come
to an agreement on decision-making principles and on some common “rules of the
game” shared by everyone.
Therefore, the theory of intersubjective management, equally with personal knowl-
edge of actors, represented in the form of ontologies, contains intersubjective knowl-
edge, being the result of the actors’ agreements within the framework of semantic,
empiric, logic, operational and normative intersubjectivities (Huebner 1996) (see sec-
tion 1.6). This knowledge, as well, is proposed to represent with the aid of ontologies:
ontologies of corporative culture, of decision-making, of activity, of facts, normative
and legal ontology (Vittikh et al. 2012a).
Ontology of corporative culture. Intersubjective theory comprises a restricted multi-
tude of actors who must be unified by a common culture, which is frequently named as
corporative, since, otherwise, attainment of mutual understanding is extremely difficult
(or impossible at all) even in the case when indeterminacy of situation is exceedingly
small and it could be settled at the level of local mutual understanding without use of
any global structures (for example, normative and legal acts). Semantic intersubjec-
tivity, in this case, involves a common representation and consent of actors in relation
to the corporation’s mission, its value priorities and rules of corporative behavior. All
that aggregate of appropriate notions and relations among them can be expressed by
means of ontology of corporative culture, allowing the partners to conduct a dialogue
“in the same language”, understanding each other quickly enough.
Ontology of decision-making. Logical intersubjectivity is associated with achieve-
ment of consent between the actors in the logics of decision-making. It is far to mean
that we have in mind classical logics based on the sequence of “notion—judgment—
conclusion”, since in the hermeneutical logics, for example, it is just the conclusion
that becomes primary. The conclusion appears when “indeterminacy, wherein the
man discovers himself, requires an immediate decision” (Mikhaylov 2003). Logics of
decision-making may proceed from democratic or, otherwise, from autocratic prin-
ciples, etc. Furthermore, one can use in a real life not one but a multitude of logics
(Shuman 2004). Description of this aggregate in the form on notions and relations will
represent ontology of decision-making which must be shared by all the actors who
take part in regulating a problem situation.
Ontology of activity. Operational intersubjectivity proceeds from interpretation abil-
ity of actions patterns. At the same time, it is supposed that a certain succession of
actions (of technologies) is based on this pattern by an obligatorily accessible manner.
Separate elements of such technology and their succession, constituting this pattern,
are understood by everyone in a unique manner and can be reproduced in the same
form. In essence, the question is about “admissible technologies” of activity, which
may be used on the basis of a common consent (consensus). The aggregate of these
kinds of activity may be represented in the form of ontology of activity including
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description of technologies with specification of responsibility for their implemen-
tation (as it was done, for example, in the work Vittikh et al. 2009a). Ontology of
activity, thus, will not only provide with its regulation, but contribute to the rise of
level of actors’ personal responsibility.
Ontology of facts. Empirical intersubjectivity assumes to be necessary the well-
founded nature of judgments by facts which must be recognized by all actors who are in
the problem situation, as far as, otherwise, mutual understanding becomes problematic.
Therefore, elaboration of the ontology of facts becomes significant; these facts must
be classified by degree of their trustworthiness: from rumors generating doubts up
to precedents allowing using the cases which took place in the past, to justify the
decisions one is making in the present time. With all that, ontology doesn’t include,
of course, the facts that have taken place, but, in opinion of actors, mustn’t be taken
into consideration (by any causes).
Normative and legal ontology. Normative intersubjectivity assumes generally
accepted character of norms and rules of behavior or appraisal, in conformity of which
can be built a normative and legal ontology, containing an interconnected complex of
laws, orders, standards, agreements and other normative regulatory documents which
secure regulation of relationships of actors at a certain level of indeterminacy of the
situation. If however the degree of indeterminacy of situation rises, exceeding an allow-
able threshold, new rules of actors’ interaction are elaborated, which transform nor-
mative and legal ontology, and it means that a permanent monitoring of normative and
legal framework must be arranged. This kind of ontologies, implemented in the form of
computerized normative and legal framework of knowledge were used, particularly, at
elaboration of regional system of provision of governmental and municipal services in
electronic forms to the population of the Samara region, Russia (Vittikh et al. 2009b).
It is to note that, to attain actors’ intersubjective agreements, elaboration and
appliance of appropriate systems of communicative actions’ support is required
(Vittikh et al. 2012b).
3.5 Attainment of Actors’ Mutual Understanding
On the basis of the elaborated theory of intersubjective management, including per-
sonal and intersubjective knowledge in the form of ontologies, actors build in common
an Ontological Model of Situation (OMS), with the help of which they comprehend
the sense of the formed problem situation (Vittikh 2009b). In contrast to ontologies of
a theory, containing abstract notions and relationships between them, OMS describes
specific objects of the real world. For example, there are some notions in the railway
traffic which are “general” and not bound to an actual situation: route, train, car-
riage, stage between stations, station, points, engine-driver, traffic controller, etc., but
the relationships between them are: relationship of inclusion (carriages form a train),
relationship of place (train is on a station or on a stage), relationship of action (traf-
fic controller changes the points position, engine-driver drives the train), etc. (Vittikh
2005; Vittikh et al. 2003). At the same time, in OMS, the question is about a specific
train which is composed of 8 carriages and which follows the route from London to
Cambridge, while the problem situation consists in the fact that, in connection with an
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increase of passengers flow, a demand occurred to introduce an additional high-speed
express train and it should be resulted in variation of train schedule on the division
between London and Cambridge. OMS includes the description of the railway net-
work composed of stations, stages, trains, engine-drivers with their attributes, as well
as conditions and restrictions at schedule forming: traffic safety intervals, availability
of unoccupied train crews, priorities and speeds of train traffic, availability of side
tracks at the stations to set there the trains under overtaking, etc.
The example, given in Vittikh et al. (2003), assumes that, on the London-Cambridge
division, there are three trains running which depart from London with a five minutes
interval. The added express train should run with a higher speed, but it results in “a
deadlock situation”, consisting in the fact that the express train can overtake usual
local trains on stages between stations, where there is only one main road in the bound
direction. Thus, the problem is how to arrange the transit of this train without disturbing
the traffic safety.
Safety index is in priority for the traffic controller. At the same time, the railway
administration, in connection with variation of traffic schedule due to the added express
train, may aspire to gain additional profits from this situation; as for engine-drivers,
they aspire to have wages increase. So, OMS will include all this knowledge and data
characterizing various points of view of the actors (administrators, traffic controllers,
engine-drivers), their subjective understanding of the problem situation.
Nevertheless, it is far to mean that the problem is solved, since the decision-making,
which is convenient for everybody, takes place under the conditions of multitude of
resource restrictions (financial, technologic, power supply etc). Therefore, the OMS
built by actors is a formulation of the problem but not a solution thereof. The above-
stated position matches to a large degree with the views of Laurière (1991), who,
speaking about solution of problems one meets in the every-day-life, had in mind
rather “analysis and representation of specific situations” than the solution it-self. “To
formulate a problem means first of all to understand conditions of the problem or,
in other words, to find an appropriate representation”. In other words, the originally
elaborated OMS reflects understanding of the problem by actors, but they haven’t yet
attained mutual understanding as to the manner to regulate the problem situation that
would be convenient for everyone.
Then, the actors begin to conduct experiences with OMS, defending their posi-
tions, on the one hand, and taking in account the interests of their colleagues and
valuable benchmarks of groups, from the other hand. There is a step-by-step OMS
transformation, in result of which OMS is elaborated and this OMS is shared by all
the actors wherethe mutual understanding of heterogeneous actor is attained at last
(Vittikh 2012b). It is important to have in mind that the actors’ preferences depend on
the context and character of interactions among them, and the preferences scales are
being formed in the process on negotiations themselves, not being rigidly specified a
priori (Sapir 2001). This circumstance, restricting the appliance of classical mathe-
matical methods when experimenting with OMS, results in necessity to look for other
methods and tools among which are multi-agent models and technologies (Skobelev
2010; Vittikh and Skobele 2003).
It should be noted that a general scheme of such ontological modeling was suggested
and discussed in details in the work (Smirnov 2012).
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3.6 Decision-Making
The decision-making to regulate a problem situation on the basis of the theory of inter-
subjective management is directly connected with attainment of actors’ mutual under-
standing and consensus, i.e. their common consent in the disputable issue, obtained
by way of negotiations, due to convergence of the actors’ positions. More precisely,
consensus is not a unanimity, it doesn’t mean that “everybody votes pro”, it means
only that “nobody votes contra” (Ackoff 2009). Consensus is being formed gradually,
in proportion as OMS under transformation comes nearer to the model shared by all
the actors. And, if OMS doesn’t arrange even one of actors, the decision is not made.
Such an approach may be resulted in undesirable delays in decision-making under
the conflict of interests’ conditions of the actors. However, if to stake on their solidarity,
then the way out can be found; it is necessary, for this purpose,to arrange monitoring of
the speed of the problem situation’s development. When actors will begin to understand
that the time reserves of decision-making will have expired in the nearest future, it
will stimulate them to go on mutual concessions, to look for compromises. And it
means that the number of OMS transformations, necessary to attain consensus, will
self-regulate, providing the ability to control in real time.
Alternative is the traditional “majority principle”: not to waste time for a long term
negotiations and for convergence of positions, but to make decision by a simple voting.
In this event, time could be saved indeed, but there will be no guaranty of decision’s
quality, since a part of actors having weighty arguments will not agree with the chosen
way to regulate the situation. “As is well known since the times of Condorcet, the
majority rule does not guarantee the expression of preferences of society, i.e. it can
lead to irrational results… It is noteworthy that the classical decision theory leads
to a tense confrontation of rationality and irrationality, but leaves everything as is”
(Luhmann 2000).
In fact, we are so accustomed, indeed, to do a choice according to the principle of
“majority”, that, usually, we don’t think about “minority” and what this minority is
expected to be in result of the decision made (not in the minority’s favor). At the same
time, history brings us many lessons of negative consequences derived from the dictates
by majority, resulting in infringement of rights and freedoms of a part of people.
Therefore, the theory of intersubjective management is being built exactly consensus-
based, presupposing a non-violent decision-making and, in this sense, meeting the
principles of free society.
4 Conclusion
These last years, within the framework of the global idea to modernize our society,
we see development of lines of activity and implementation of appropriate programs
connected with organization and perfection of the process of management: electronic
democracy, electronic government, private-state partnership, public-state partnership,
information society development, etc. They are aimed to expand participation of citi-
zen, business and social organizations in lawmaking, to make adopt socially significant
decisions by authority, to perform the processes of State, municipal and corporative
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governance. And what’s more, following traditional conceptions, the solution of these
problems is made on the basis of the principles of classical bureaucracy with its rigid
hierarchy of power, functional specialization, procedures regulations, disregard of
personal qualities of people, etc. This “mechanistic nature” and “depersonalization”
of bureaucratic structures, which ensured their success in the industrial epoch, have
begun to be nowadays a hindrance for social, economical and humanitarian devel-
opment, since the world has become open and dynamic, the man started to realize
him-self more and more free therein, communication has become a productive force,
social self-organization has got development. In these conditions, any redecorating of
bureaucratic machine which doesn’t touch its fundamentals cannot ensure any proper
efficiency of management in the present-day society. A change of the very paradigm
of management is required.
Exactly for this purpose, this work proposes the principles of construction of the
theory of intersubjective management, based on postnonclassical scientific rationality
and on concept of free society, wherein the stake is made on non-violent means of
decision-making oriented towards attainment of mutual understanding and consensus.
Yet it is only an introduction to the theory, and not the theory itself, but its publication
is conditioned by a matured need to draw attention to the above-named problem and to
expand the circle of scientists and professionals involved in search of the solution. Of
course, the theory of intersubjective management is a certain idealization (as, however,
any other theory, including the “ideal bureaucracy”), but, over the years, it will become
more and more in line with the realities of the future information society.
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